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Contract Law and the
Liberalism of Fear
Nathan B. Oman*
Liberalism’s concern with human freedom seems related to contractual
freedom and thus contract law. There are, however, many strands of
OLEHUDOWKRXJKWDQGZKLFKRIWKHPEHVWMXVWL¿HVFRQWUDFWLVDGLI¿FXOW
question. In The Choice Theory of Contracts, Hanoch Dagan and
Michael Heller offer a vision of contract based on autonomy. Drawing
on the work of Joseph Raz, they argue that extending autonomy should
be the law’s primary concern, which requires that we extend the range
of contractual choices available. While there is much to admire in
their work, I argue that autonomy as conceived by Dagan and Heller
cannot justify contract law. First, there are reasons to doubt the
coherence of autonomy as an ideal. Second, given the pluralism of
liberal societies, which, for example, often include substantial numbers
of religious believers who reject core assumptions of autonomy theory,
it is doubtful that such a theory can legitimate contract law. A more
modest version of liberalism concerned primarily with protection
against cruelty and providing a modus vivendi in pluralistic societies
is more tenable. Such a vision of liberalism yields a more modest
vision of contract law. Rather than making it into another means
of realizing the dream of a more autonomous self, it is enough that
contract law facilitates commerce and the marketplace. Markets in
turn can serve an important — albeit limited — role in sustaining the
peaceful cooperation and coexistence toward which a more realistic
liberalism should aim.
*

Rita Ann Rollins Professor, William & Mary Law School. I presented an earlier
draft of this paper at a conference on “Freedom, Choice, and Contract” at
&ROXPELD/DZ6FKRROZKHUH,EHQH¿WHGIURPWKHUHVSRQVHVRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
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also grateful for criticisms of an earlier draft from Brian Bix, Evan Criddle, and
James Stern. As always, I thank Heather.
Cite as: Nathan Oman, Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 381 (2019).

382

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 20.2:381

INTRODUCTION
There is a long association of contract law with liberal political theory. John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes famously grounded the legitimacy of the state
itself in an original social contract.1 On this view, all law is in some sense
contractual, and all legal obligations can be traced back to an original contract.
7KHVWDWHRIQDWXUHDQGDQRULJLQDOVRFLDOFRQWUDFWDUHRIFRXUVH¿FWLWLRXV
However, the recognition of this fact hasn’t eliminated contract from theories
of liberalism. Most famously, in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls posits a
hypothetical original position where the agreement of the parties yields
principles of political justice.2 Ironically, given this long history of association,
liberal political theorists are often uninterested in and apparently ignorant of
private law in general and contract law in particular. Thus Rawls, haunted by
the specter of laissez-faire capitalism, insisted that the law of property and
contract are not part of the “basic structure” to which the principles of justice
apply.3 The same is not true of legal scholars. Theorists of contract law have
long been attracted to liberal political theories as a possible source for the
normative foundations of contract law.4 Thus, contract law theory abounds
with arguments that invoke the language of rights, liberty, autonomy, and
consent familiar from liberal political theory.

1

2

3

4

See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Luslett, 1988)
(1690) (offering a social contract theory of political obligation); THOMAS HOBBES,
HOBBES: LEVIATHAN: REVISED STUDENT EDITION (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651)
(same).
Rawls was also critiqued in contractualist terms, with Ronald Dworkin noting
that a hypothetical contract was no contract at all. See Ronald Dworkin, The
Original Position, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS’ A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 16–52 (Norman Daniels ed., 1989).
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Of course, liberties
not on the list, for example, the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g.,
means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of
laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the
¿UVWSULQFLSOH´ 
See generally STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004) (providing an exhaustive
summary of rights-based theories of contract law); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) (offering a liberal
theory of contract based on promising); DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT:
TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003) (offering a liberal theory of
contract based on a different theory of promising).
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In The Choice Theory of Contracts (CTC),5 Hanoch Dagan and Michael
Heller write in this tradition, offering a novel theory of contract law that
grounds its normative foundations in a robust political morality centered
on the ideal of human autonomy. CTC takes its normative bearings from
the perfectionist liberalism of Joseph Raz, which sees the primary purpose
and duty of the state in terms of expanding the menu of choices available to
citizens. By placing autonomy at the center of normative analysis, the menu
of choices becomes in some sense morally prior to any of the ends that might
be pursued by particular choices. The implications of this stance are elegantly
articulated by CTC. The result is a vision of contract law that is both more
imperialistic — large swaths of legal doctrine often not thought of as primarily
contractual now become part of “contract law” — while at the same time
PRUHGLYHUVHDQGOHVVXQL¿HGLQWHUPVRILWVGRFWULQDOVWUXFWXUH
Autonomy, however, is by no means the only basis for allegiance to a liberal
political order. Indeed, we have good reasons to doubt both its theoretical
and practical attractions. There are less normatively ambitious visions of
liberalism that are worth considering.6 On this view, the purpose of liberal
political institutions is not to maximize individual autonomy. Indeed, one
need not accept human autonomy as a moral desideratum per se to defend
liberalism. Rather, the virtue of a liberal society is that given certain historical
conditions it provides the best hope for peaceful coexistence among those
with deeply felt — and often deeply illiberal — moral commitments. This less
ambitious vision of liberalism also has implications for contract doctrine. In
particular, it supports a more modest vision of contract law, one that properly
places market transactions at the center of legal doctrine.7 As for the new
domains brought within the gambit of contract law theory by CTC, a less
ambitious liberalism would be far more content to see these areas of law as

5
6

7

ণ$12&+'$*$1 0,&+$(/+(//(5, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017)
[hereinafter CTC].
See, e.g., Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL
LIFE 21 1DQF\/5RVHQEOXPHG  DUJXLQJWKDWOLEHUDOLVPLVMXVWL¿HGE\
the need to avoid cruelty by the government); DAVID MCCABE, MODUS VIVENDI
LIBERALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE   DUJXLQJWKDWOLEHUDOLVPLVMXVWL¿HG
because it provides a modus vivendi for those with otherwise incommensurable
moral beliefs).
See generally NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016) (arguing that markets support a
liberal society in which those with deep moral disagreements can live peacefully
together and that contract law should be seen as primarily about supporting such
markets).
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ad hoc accommodations to social realities rather than special incarnations of
an overarching and almost all-encompassing vision of autonomy and contract.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief summary of the
argument advanced in CTC. This is the most sophisticated autonomy theory
of contract that has yet been offered. Part II offers reasons why autonomy
cannot ultimately do the work to which it is put in this theory. Political and
OHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQVPXVWLQWKHRU\EHMXVWL¿DEOHWRWKRVHRYHUZKRPWKH\FODLP
authority. Autonomy theory, however, does not fully appreciate the depth
of moral disagreement present in liberal societies. When alternative moral
stances, such as those informed by monotheistic religions, are seriously
considered, the assumptions of autonomy theory are revealed as too deeply
FRQWHVWDEOHWRSURYLGHDMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUOHJDODQGSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV3DUW
,,,H[SORUHVDOWHUQDWLYHMXVWL¿FDWLRQVIRUOLEHUDOSROLWLFDODQGOHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
,QSODFHRIDPELWLRXVWKHRULHVRISHUVRQDODXWRQRP\WKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRU
such institutions lies in their ability to mediate the peaceful coexistence of
those with incommensurable moral commitments. One of these mediating
institutions is the market, which provides a mechanism of cooperation in the
face of moral pluralism. Within this approach to liberalism, the purpose of
contract is not to foster autonomy but to foster commerce. This, in turn, means
that contrary to CTC, marriage and other noncommercial subjects ought not
to be brought within the gambit of contract law.

I. AUTONOMY, LIBERALISM, AND CONTRACT
2QHSRVVLEOHGH¿QLWLRQRIOLEHUDOLVPLVDSROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\WKDWSODFHV
human freedom at the center of its normative orientation toward civic life.
According to one popular and plausible history of liberalism, liberal political
LQVWLWXWLRQV¿QGWKHLURULJLQVLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZDUV
of religion.8 On this view liberalism represents a retreat from more ambitious
forms of politics grounded in religious confessions that tied the state to a
complete vision of human existence and salvation. These efforts, so goes the
traditional story, were abandoned in the interests of religious peace. However,
the dominant strand of modern liberalism has greater ambitions than the
mere peaceful coexistence of differing religious groups. Rather, it rests on a
conception of human beings that sees them primarily as choosers. As the point
8

See, e.g., MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY   ³7KH¿UVWKDOIRIWKH
seventeenth century saw bloody explosions of religious violence in both Britain
and continental Europe. Most American colonists came to the New World in
ÀLJKWIURPUHOLJLRXVSHUVHFXWLRQ´ 
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is often made by liberal political philosophers, individuals should be free to
choose their own conception of the good life and to pursue it.9 It is possible
to understand this injunction in purely political terms, as a pragmatic stance
towards the scope of political power and legitimacy. However, many liberal
SKLORVRSKHUVWDNHWKHSRLQWWRKDYHDGHHSHUVLJQL¿FDQFH)RUWKHVHWKLQNHUV
KXPDQÀRXULVKLQJUHTXLUHVWKDWDQ\JRRGOLIHEHDOLIHWKDWLQVRPHVHQVH
that person can claim to have authored him- or herself. In other words, what
makes a particular conception of the good proper for a person lies less in the
substantive content of that conception than in the fact that it was chosen by
that person. This is a view of liberalism that places at its center a strong vision
of autonomous individuals authoring and choosing their own conception of
what constitutes a good life.
Within liberalisms that place at their center human freedom, there is a
vicious family debate between those that see freedom primarily in terms of
independence and those who conceptualize freedom as primarily a matter of
individual autonomy.10 The view that prioritizes independence is most closely
associated with libertarian theorists such as Robert Nozick.11 On this view
the heart of freedom lies in the absence of outside coercion and restraint.
The goal of liberal political institutions should be to limit the reach of the
state and suppress force and fraud by private parties in human relationships.12
Non-libertarian liberals, however, have been deeply critical of this stance,
some going so far as to deny that libertarianism is a legitimate member of the
liberal family.13)RUDXWRQRP\WKHRULVWVPHUHLQGHSHQGHQFHLVLQVXI¿FLHQWWR
secure meaningful freedom for individuals. Rather, those individuals must be
HQGRZHGZLWKVXI¿FLHQWPDWHULDOLQWHOOHFWXDODQGVRFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRFUDIW
9

See, e.g., John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 3+,/ 
PUB. AFF. 251 (1988) (arguing that the state should protect individuals in their
rights but not impose on them a comprehensive vision of the good).
10 See CTC, supra note 5, at 41-45 (discussing the distinction between independence
and autonomy).
11 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (2d ed. 2013) (arguing for a
minimalist state).
12 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 46 (2003) (“No society can afford to allow a tiny fraction
of its population to compel the rest of the population to live in fear, so these
twin prohibitions against force fraud become the bedrock principle on which
all legal systems rest, the obvious source of the priority of what Isaiah Berlin
(not quite accurately) called ‘negative liberty.’”).
13 See generally Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is
not a Liberal View, 30 3+,/ 38%$)) 105 (2001) (attacking the liberal bona
¿GHVRIOLEHUWDULDQWKHRULHV 
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for themselves meaningful lives and a meaningful account of the good life.
One way of thinking about the difference between autonomy liberalism and
independence liberalism is in terms of what we might call the conditions of
autonomy. For libertarian-minded theorists, the conditions of autonomy are
relatively narrow. It is enough that choices be free of fraud or coercion. On
the other hand, for autonomy theorists the conditions for autonomy are more
generous. Hence, philosophers such as Joseph Raz have argued that the state
has an obligation to make available to its citizens a meaningful array of life
options.14
&7&OLHV¿UPO\ZLWKLQWKLVDXWRQRP\WUDGLWLRQRIOLEHUDOLVP15 According
WR&7&RXUJRDOVKRXOGEHWRPD[LPL]HKXPDQIUHHGRP7KLVUHTXLUHV¿UVW
that, subject to important exceptions, the state not coerce its citizens and that
it protect them from the coercion of others. Such independence, however, is
not enough. The ability to exercise choice is meaningless if there is a limited
array of options from which to choose. This is true even if most of the options
on the menu hold little or no appeal to the chooser.16 The savor of the dish
chosen, according to CTC, is improved by a knowledge of and opportunity
to choose a different dish, preferably many different dishes. Thus the state
KDVDQDI¿UPDWLYHREOLJDWLRQWRJHQHUDWHDPHQXRIRSWLRQVIURPZKLFKWR
choose. Crucially, autonomy is prior to any of the goods offered by particular
options. Autonomy is not a means by which other goods are achieved.17 Rather,
CTC insists that such goods are valuable because they generate an autonomyexpanding range of options. The menu at the restaurant is not a means of
getting a good meal. Rather, the range of good meals offered by the restaurant
exists in order to create the menu. The act of choosing and ordering the meal
is given priority over the experience of eating it or the quality of the food.
14 See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1988) (setting forth a
comprehensive defense of an autonomy-based politcal morality).
15 See CTC, supra note 5, at 68 (“[W]e develop two points from Raz’s political
philosophy with particular usefulness for contract theory: (1) to be free, individuals
need meaningful choice and (2) states have a necessary role in supporting the
availability of valuable options.”).
16 See Id. at 103 (“The importance of this … point cannot be overstated. Having
stable and normatively attractive forms available to reject makes one’s chosen
contract type even more of an expression of individual autonomy.”).
17 Id. at 68 (“The key to understanding contractual autonomy is to see it … as
a good that needs to be fostered. But what does that imperative mean in the
context of our diverse world of contracting practices? Answering this question
is what leads to choice theory. In a sentence, we foster the good of contractual
autonomy by ensuring freedom of contracts – that is, by supporting adequate
availability of choice among types.”).
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This model of autonomy has a number of implications for contract law.
7KH¿UVWFDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVDUHYHUVDORI+HQU\0DLQH¶VGLFWXPDERXWWKH
passage from status to contract. By status he meant a set of legal obligations
attached to a particular role, an off-the-rack set of rights and duties authored
by society. Contract, in turn, consists of obligations authored in their entirety
by the parties. “We may say,” he wrote, “that the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”18 On this
view something like Samuel Williston’s abstract doctrinal structure, which
sought an ideal where the law of contracts had virtually no substantive content
beyond that provided by the parties, was the ideal of contract.19 In Maine’s
formulation status is a primitive, less free and liberal form of social organization,
while the advent of an abstract and general law of contract marks the advent
of a free society.20
CTC is sharply critical of the Willistonian formulation, but not for the
UHDVRQVWKDWKDYHEHHQFRPPRQDPRQJFRQWUDFWVFKRODUVVLQFHLWV¿QDO
synthesis in the opening decades of the twentieth century.21 Williston has
generally been derided — perhaps unfairly — for his formalism.22 This is
the heart of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’FULWLFLVPVRIWKH¿UVW
Restatement, which was largely authored by Williston, who served as the
¿UVWRestatement’s reporter.23 Hence, for example, the Second Restatement
relaxed the formalism of the First Restatement’s preexisting duty rules, taking
DPRUHUHOD[HGVWDQFHWRZDUGFRQWUDFWXDOPRGL¿FDWLRQV24 Likewise, the
18 See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Frederick Pollock & Raymond
Firth eds., 1963).
19 See CTC, supra note 5, at 7-9 (summarizing what it calls the “Willistonian
constraint” in contact law).
20 See Nathan B. Oman, Reconsidering Contractual Consent: Why We Shouldn’t
Worry too Much About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 215,
224–25 (2017) (discussing the background of Maine’s theory).
21 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 72–73 (The Storrs
Lectures ed. 1979) (discussing the formalist, “Langdellian” nature of Williston’s
scholarship on contracts); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1697–98 (1976) (criticizing Williston’s
formalism as overly technical and confused).
22 See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 :$6+ /((/
REV. 207 (2005) (arguing that Williston has been unfairly attacked as a mindless
formalist).
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (offering a
synthesis of mid-twentieth century neoclassical contract doctrine).
24 Compare Id. VHWWLQJIRUWKWKHUXOHRQFRQWUDFWPRGL¿FDWLRQV with RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS §84 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (setting forth the preexisting duty rule).

388

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 20.2:381

Second Restatement broadened standard-like contractual defenses, borrowing
the doctrine of unconscionability from the Uniform Commercial Code.25
Alternatively, Williston was attacked by Grant Gilmore and later the critical
legal studies movement as part of a broader attack on individualism and freemarket economics, with which they associated him.26 Today these criticisms
from a generation ago feel dated. Law and economics scholars have mounted
a largely successful defense of more formalist approaches to contract law,
at least in business-to-business contracts.27 CTC, however, offers a novel
critique of the Willistonian synthesis. The problem is that it mistakes a part of
contracting — commercial contracts — for the whole. On this view, a menu
of status-like relations — off-the-rack bundles of rights and duties variable to
a greater or lesser extent by agreement — enhances autonomy by increasing
options.28 Far from representing a vestige of anachronistic, pre-liberal thought,
they represent an increase in personal autonomy. Indeed the profusion of such
options is central to autonomy, so central that in many situations the state has
an obligation to create such statuses in order to enhance choice.29
One result of CTC’s move to place autonomy at the center of contract
law is that areas of law that have traditionally been assumed to be outside of
contract now become part of the law that CTC purports to explain. Consider
family law, which CTC unapologetically treats marriage as part of contract
25 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(setting forth the defense of unconscionability) with U.C.C. §2-302 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) (same).
26 See GILMORE, supra note 21, at 72–73 (discussing the formalist, “Langdellian”
nature of Williston’s scholarship on contracts); Kennedy, supra note 21, at
1697–98 (criticizing Williston’s formalism as overly technical and confused).
27 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J.   DUJXLQJWKDWLQ¿UPWR¿UPFRQWUDFWV
courts should formalistically apply a hard-edged version of the parol evidence
rule).
28 See CTC, supra note 5, at 103.
29 Writing in the early 20th century, Nathan Isaacs argued that the rise of boilerplate
contracts represented a reversal of Maine’s progress from status to contract,
with private actors now authoring the obligations associated with each status.
See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34
(1917) (discussing contracts of adhesion as a reversal of Maine’s progression,
with contract giving way to status). CTC more or less embraces this point, but
sees it as advancing personal autonomy through the private authorship of new
contract types. See Id. at 115 (“legal entrepreneurs see value from one-off creation
RIQHZIRUPVWKDWDUHWKHQVWDQGDUGL]HGUHSOLFDWHGDQGVRPHWLPHVFRGL¿HGDV
discrete types.”).
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law. In CTC’s conceptualization, marriage exists to further autonomy. To
be sure, marriage provides goods such as love, companionship, support,
an environment for child-rearing and the like, a set of concerns that CTC
would broadly conceptualize under the heading of “community.”30 Some of
these goods might be contingent on the voluntary nature of the relationship.
One might believe that love cannot arise out of an unchosen or involuntary
relationship.31 However, according to CTC, autonomy in marital decisions
is not a means to these ends. Rather, the availability of a marital option that
allows for love, companionship, and joint child-rearing is valuable because
it enhances our autonomy. This means that alternatives to traditional forms
of heterosexual marriage, such as cohabitation, are valuable because they
enhance our autonomy.32 Likewise, “utopian” models of marriage such as
covenant marriage or open marriage also enhance the autonomy of all.33 Their
availability broadens the range of our choices even if they aren’t chosen.
7KHOLPLWVRIDXWRQRP\WKHRU\KRZHYHUFDQEHVHHQLQWKHGLI¿FXOW\RI
using CTC to account for the most dramatic recent innovation in this area:
the rise of same-sex marriage. Autonomy as conceptualized by CTC was not
central to the arguments that resulted in the success of same-sex marriage.
The demand for legal recognition was not primarily grounded in autonomy.34
30 See CTC, supra note 5, at 60 (discussing marriage in terms of a contract that
foster’s “thick community”).
31 This claim is doubtful especially outside the relatively recent invention of
romantic love and companionate marriage. Children love parents whom they do
not choose, and many cultures have arranged marriages involving varying levels
of choice by the bride and groom. Love frequently arises in such relationships,
despite their not having been fully voluntary according to Western norms. The
logic of such relationships is captured in song in an exchange between Tevye
and Golde in Fiddler on the Roof:
(Golde)
Do I love him?
)RUWZHQW\¿YH\HDUV,¶YHOLYHGZLWKKLP
Fought with him, starved with him
)RUWZHQW\¿YH\HDUVP\EHGLVKLV
If that’s not love, what is?
JERRY BOCK, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (2011).
32 See CTC, supra note 5, at 121-22 (discussing the autonomy-enhancing role of
alternative family arrangements).
33 See CTC, supra note 5, at 119-20 (“This approach is relevant to the ‘horizontal’
dimension of alternatives to conventional marriage – such as cohabitation, civil
unions, and covenant marriage.”).
34 It’s also worth noting that the arguments in opposition to same-sex marriage were
largely orthogonal to questions of autonomy. For many religious traditionalists,
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Indeed, key to the success of the LGBT rights movement is the recognition
that sexual orientation is not a choice. Gays and lesbians should not be seen
as sexual perverts wrongfully rejecting traditional models of heterosexuality.
Rather, homosexual desires, like heterosexual desires, are innate.
7KHTXHVWIRUVDPHVH[PDUULDJHWKXVUHVSRQGHGWRWZRLPSXOVHV7KH¿UVW
was the recognition that gay and lesbian couples form lasting monogamous
unions to pursue the same kinds of goods — erotic attachment, companionship,
support, and child-rearing — pursued by opposite sex couples.35 This was
not primarily an appeal to the requirements of autonomy. Gays and lesbians
deny that their sexual orientation is a choice. Likewise, the appeal of same-sex
marriage was not that it would create a new choice, but rather that it would
accommodate an already existing social practice in a more humane way. The
law should recognize these facts and eliminate the host of legal burdens —
great and petty — faced by same-sex couples. The second impulse was the
desire for recognition.36 Despite the sexual revolution and the decline of taboos
against premarital sex and cohabitation, marriage remains the preeminent way
in which society validates romantic unions. It was thus understandable that
recognition of the innateness of sexual orientation and the rejection of the
view that homosexuality is a perverse choice were coupled with the desire
marriage is a primary human relationship that responds to the creation of human
beings as embodied men and women by God. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay
Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV. 619, 625-26 (2015) (discussing the views of
marriage held by religious traditionalists); Rod Dreher, Sex After Christianity,
AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/
articles/sex-after-christianity. This traditionalist view of marriage has, of course,
been rejected in American law and many other nations in favor of a view of
marriage that includes same-sex couples. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
(2015) (holding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry under
the laws of the United States).
35 See, e.g., JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that same-sex unions
pursue the same set of goods as opposite-sex unions).
36 See, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated by
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (invalidating Proposition 8 as
unconstitutional, in part because it took away the “status and dignity of marriage”
for same-sex couples); Nan D. Hunter, The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage:
More Questions than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1997 (2012) (“there is
WKHV\PEROLFVLJQL¿FDQFHRIUHODWLRQVKLSUHFRJQLWLRQ² and, in particular,
of marriage equality — because it places gay and lesbian couples on an equal
footing with all other married couples, according them the same ‘status and dignity’
as other couples through public recognition of their relationships.”).
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that same-sex unions be accorded legal recognition as marriages. Tellingly,
neither of these impulses arise out of a need to create a longer menu of marital
options in order to enhance individual autonomy. Rather, they arise from needs
and desires that are essentially orthogonal to autonomy. This awkwardness at
WKHWKHRUHWLFDOHGJHRI&7&SRLQWVWRZDUGDGHHSHUSUREOHPWKHGLI¿FXOW\RI
defending legal institutions in general, and liberal institutions in particular,
using autonomy.

II. LIBERALISM WITHOUT AUTONOMY
I am unpersuaded that autonomy can generate either practical or theoretical
legitimacy for political and legal institutions. Accordingly, this section argues
that autonomy cannot provide an adequate theory of contract law. CTC relies
on the autonomy-based argument for liberalism put forward by Joseph Raz.
This section suggests some reasons for doubting the ability of autonomy to do
WKHMXVWL¿FDWRU\ZRUNWRZKLFK5D]DQG&7&SXWLW,QSDUWLFXODUDXWRQRP\
based arguments rest on highly contestable moral premises that are rejected
by many reasonable citizens. The examples here are drawn mainly from
religious beliefs. My point is not to offer a theological critique of the Razian
position or argue that theological arguments standing alone can legitimate
political and legal institutions. Rather, I am making the more modest point
that religious believers often reject some of the key moral assumptions on
which autonomy theory rests. These beliefs must be taken seriously by any
theory that purports to justify the authority of political or legal institutions
RYHUVXFKSHRSOH3ROLWLFDODXWKRULW\PXVWEHMXVWL¿HGLQWHUPVWKDWFDQEH
accepted by all of those who are members of the political community, and
it is both a theoretical and practical mistake to assume that there is a moral
consensus around the assumptions of autonomy theories, even when such
assumptions may seem self-evident. They are not.
)RUWXQDWHO\WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWOLEHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVFDQQRWEHMXVWL¿HG
+RZHYHUWKH\FDQRQO\EHMXVWL¿HGE\OHVVPRUDOO\DPELWLRXVWKHRULHV2QWKLV
view, liberal institutions — including contract law — are legitimate because
they provide mechanisms for peaceful coexistence in societies riven by deep
moral disagreements. By jettisoning autonomy as a foundation, liberalism
can rest on more modest and thus more widely acceptable premises.
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A. Problems with Autonomy Theories of Liberalism
CTC is based on a theory of autonomy drawn from the work of Joseph Raz.37
However, there are reasons to doubt whether a Razian notion of autonomy
can justify contract law. We have good reasons to believe that reasonable
people can reject the notion of autonomy advanced by Raz and that as a
practical matter there are many people who would in fact reject the theory.
7KLVUDLVHVGLI¿FXOWLHVIRUDQ\WKHRU\RIODZWKDWUHVWVRQD5D]LDQQRWLRQ
of autonomy. It is by no means clear that an autonomy-advancing body of
law can legitimately claim authority over those who reject autonomy as a
proper political goal. In the discussion that follows I draw repeatedly on ideas
from monotheistic theologies. My aim in doing so is not to make any point
about theology or religion per se. Rather, I draw on religion because these
faiths are widely accepted and vigorous moral traditions. They provide an
important corrective to a certain kind of philosophical intuition mongering
that builds theories on premises that appear stronger than they in fact are
merely because they are widely accepted among those who construct political
and legal theories. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt
of in our philosophies, and it is useful to be reminded that there is greater
diversity of reasonable beliefs and moral assumptions in our societies than
our theories at times assume. This does not mean that one can legitimately
JURXQGOHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLQSXUHO\WKHRORJLFDOEHOLHIVEXWWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQRI
such institutions cannot rest on arguments that fail to grapple with the very
different moral assumptions that animate the lives of many citizens.
There are several features that make Raz’s notion of autonomy problematic.
7KH¿UVWLVLWVKXPDQLVP5D]ZULWHV³7RVLPSOLI\WKHGLVFXVVLRQ,ZLOOHQGRUVH
right away the humanistic principle which claims that the explanation and
MXVWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHJRRGQHVVRUEDGQHVVRIDQ\WKLQJGHULYHVXOWLPDWHO\IURP
its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality.”38 Stated in
these terms, humanism seems unobjectionable, but it is unlikely that it could
command universal and perhaps even widespread acceptance outside of fairly
narrow circles in advanced liberal democracies. This is because most religious
believers are willing to entertain the possibility that there are moral principles
whose validity does not rest on their contribution to the quality of human life.
To be sure, there are theologies that place human wellbeing at the center of
God’s purposes.39 However, many religious believers place God rather than
37 See CTC, supra note 5, at 68-69 (discussing CTC’s debt to Razian theories of
autonomy and liberalism).
38 RAZ, supra note 14, at 194.
39 For example, Mormon scripture insists that God’s primary purpose focuses on
humanity. “For behold, this is my work and my glory — to bring to pass the
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humanity at the center of morality, and some of those theologies are likely to
insist that the morality of at least some actions lies not in their contributions to
human life but rather in taking a proper stance toward God. Hence, an action
PLJKWEHJRRGRUEDGQRWEHFDXVHLWORRNVWRKXPDQÀRXULVKLQJEXWEHFDXVHLW
JORUL¿HV*RGRUPDUNVVXEPLVVLRQWRKLP2IFRXUVHVXFKEHOLHYHUVDUHOLNHO\
to endorse humanism as a basis for many moral obligations, but it cannot be
assumed to be the sole basis of their morality. Furthermore, the advance of
secularization in Western societies cannot be taken as a reason for ignoring
such theologically based moral beliefs. As Charles Taylor has exhaustively
documented, modern secularization is not a matter of subtracting religion from
moral, intellectual, and social life.40 Rather, the secularization we observe in
advanced liberal democracies consists of a world in which both belief and
unbelief are live possibilities, rather than a world in which belief has been
rendered irrelevant.
The second problematic feature of Raz’s notion of autonomy is the particular
stance towards the self that it demands. Again, religious traditions point toward
the basic contestability of this stance. He writes, “to be autonomous one must
identify with one’s choices, and one must be loyal to them.”41 This loyalty
to the self and its choices, however, is far from a universally accepted moral
stance. It is not even clear that it is a particularly common moral stance. For
PDQ\SHRSOHPRUDOLW\FRQVLVWVQRWLQWKHDI¿UPDWLRQRIWKHVHOIEXWUDWKHU
in forgetfulness of the self. This can be seen in extreme, ascetic moralities,
EXWLWZRXOGEHDPLVWDNHWRLPDJLQHWKDWVNHSWLFLVPDERXWWKHDI¿UPDWLRQ
RIVHOILVFRQ¿QHGWRH[RWLFRUHVRWHULFPRUDOV\VWHPV&KULVWLDQLW\ZKLFK
remains a vital moral force in the lives of billions of people, teaches “for
whosoever shall save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life
for my [i.e.-HVXV&KULVW¶V@VDNHVKDOO¿QGLW´42 Raz also writes “A person
who feels driven by forces which he disowns but cannot control, who hates
or detests the desires which motivates him or the aims that he is pursuing,
does not lead an autonomous life.”43 This, however, could just as easily be a
description of the moral lives of many — if not most — people. Our actual
moral decisions are often beset with akrasia, anxiety, and regret. Indeed, one

40
41
42
43

immortality and eternal life of man,” says God in one Latter-day Saint text,
Moses 1:39. Another goes on to suggest that “men are, that they might have
joy” 2 Nephi 2:25.
See e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007) (providing an exhaustive
account of the origins and structure of modern secularity).
RAZ, supra note 14, at 382.
Matthew 16:25 (King James Bible).
RAZ, supra note 14, at 382.
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can think of the struggle with one’s own perverse desires as one of the central
moral quandaries that human beings face. Again, religion often points toward
DPRUDOVWDQFHYHU\PXFKDWRGGVZLWKWKHVHOIDI¿UPDWLRQXSRQZKLFKWKLV
idea of autonomy seems to be based. Protestants, for example, emphasize
the fallenness of human nature and take the depravity of human desires as
the primary frame for moral deliberation.44
The third problem is Raz’s insistence that autonomy requires independence.
This means the choices must be freely made. Choices must not only be
free of coercion but must also be free of manipulation. What Raz means by
manipulation, however, is not entirely clear. “Manipulation, unlike coercion,
does not interfere with a person’s options. Instead it perverts the way that
a person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals. It too is an
invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the importance of the distortion
it causes.”45 This formulation seems to imagine that there is a condition in
ZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOFKRLFHVDUHQRWLQYDGHGE\RXWVLGHLQÀXHQFHV$WWKHYHU\
least, it seems that we must imagine the self as an autonomous chooser that
approaches the question of living the good life in terms of choosing the
moral vision that will guide that life. This choice must be uninfected by the
manipulating force of history, circumstances, or the pressure of others.
Aristotle famously argued that outside of the context of the polis, a man
was either a god or a monster, but he could not be a human being.46 If one
abstracts this claim beyond the Greek chauvinism that often infects Aristotle’s
analysis, he is making an important claim about human agency.47 Autonomy
theory takes the independent adult as the paradigmatic case of humanity. This
autonomous adult then fearlessly authors his or her own life by choosing
the vision of the good — the moral script — that will govern that life. This
choosing self, however, can’t just miraculously appear. Identity is ultimately
grown, not chosen. Childhood, circumstances, and biology all have their claims
on the self. We are born into communities that have their own visions of the
good, visions that we lack the ability to choose until long after they have left
44 See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION II 1-2 (John T.
McNeill ed., Ford L. Battles trans., 1960) (discussing the human struggle with
original sin).
45 RAZ, supra note 14, at 377-78.
46 See ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 1253a (Carnes Lord trans., 2d ed. 2013) (c.
350 B.C.E.) (discussing the relationship between human nature and community
and the identity of man outside of the polis).
47 See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE 20TH CENTURY 123 (2006) (noting that
Aristotle tended to uncritically identify the life of an ancient Athenian aristocrat
with the highest form of human life).
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indelible marks on the self. The same is true of families, schools, and the
other institutions that take the exquisitely vulnerable life that is an infant and
gradually transform it into an adult. By the time that the independent self of
autonomy theory emerges it lacks the capacity to choose in a way that isn’t
DOUHDG\LQIHFWHGE\DOLIHWLPHRIXQFKRVHQFRPPLWPHQWVDQGLQÀXHQFHV7KLV
doesn’t mean that choice is unimportant, but it does mean that we cannot
ground its importance in a myth of the self-authoring self. There is no such
thing as an autonomous self in this sense. We are always manipulated.
One might object that this is to cast the idea of manipulation in unduly rigid
or extreme terms. Perhaps. Few proponents of autonomy would deny the reality
of childhood and the impact of history and community on the development
of the self. However, simply acknowledging these facts does not eliminate
WKHWKHRUHWLFDOGLI¿FXOW\LIRQH¶VWKHRU\IDLOVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHLULPSRUWDQFH
It is not clear from Raz’s writings how his concern for manipulation is to
be reconciled with the reality of how our choices are pervasively infected
ZLWKRXWVLGHLQÀXHQFHV2QHPLJKWDUJXHWKDWZHDUHDOZD\VPDQLSXODWHGE\
our own histories and communities, but not all forms of manipulation are
created equal. Some are pernicious and others are relatively benign. This is
surely true. A theory such as Raz’s, however, commits us to drawing that
distinction in terms of getting closer to autonomy’s ideal of an unconditioned
VHOIWKDWFKRRVHVIUHHRIRXWVLGHLQÀXHQFHV7KLVLGHDOKRZHYHULVQRWRQO\
unachievable in practice, but of dubious coherence. History, family, community,
institutions, and the like are not unfortunate and perhaps unavoidable threats
to the self. They are, as Aristotle suggests, the preconditions for any coherent
identity at all. Furthermore, there is no reason why the distinction between
OHJLWLPDWHDQGLOOHJLWLPDWHLQÀXHQFHVPXVWEHGUDZQLQWHUPVRIWKHLGHDO
of autonomy. Coercion, fraud, and other forms of pernicious manipulation
might be objected to on the ground of utility or as failures to love one’s
neighbor, to take two very different normative frameworks. Whatever their
RWKHUGH¿FLHQFLHVWKHVHIUDPHZRUNVKDYHWKHDWWUDFWLRQRIQRWUHTXLULQJWKDW
we take the unconditioned self as an ideal
Can the concept of autonomy be used to justify bodies of law that claim
authority over those that reject many of the assumptions on which a belief
LQDXWRQRP\UHVWV"5D]RIIHUVZKDWKHFDOOVWKH³QRUPDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQWKHVLV´
XQGHUZKLFKDXWKRULW\LVMXVWL¿HGLI³DSHUVRQLVPRUHOLNHO\WRDFWVXFFHVVIXOO\
for reasons which apply to him than if he does not subject himself to its
authority.”48 In other words, authority purports to offer a reason to an agent for
acting or refraining from acting. It can only do so, however, when following
authority advances reasons that the agent already has for acting. If an agent
48 RAZ, supra note 14, at 71.
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rejects the desirability and the coherence of autonomy, however, then it is
GLI¿FXOWWRVHHZK\WKHFRQFHSWRIDXWRQRP\RIIHUVKLPDUHDVRQIRUDFWLRQ2I
course, there might be other reasons that justify the authority of an autonomyadvancing body of law of the kind envisioned by CTC, but autonomy itself
isn’t among them.
For example, one might fall back on arguments based on consent. Raz
KLPVHOIH[SUHVVHVVNHSWLFLVPDERXWZKDWKHFDOOV³LQÀDWLRQDU\´WKHRULHVRI
consent, by which he seems to mean traditional social contract theories that
posit universal consent to the law.49 Rather, he offers an expressive theory
of consent. He writes:
There are various attitudes towards society that consent to the authority
of its laws can express. They can all be regarded as so many variations
RQDEDVLFDWWLWXGHRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWKWKHVRFLHW\DQDWWLWXGHRI
belonging and of sharing in its collective life. Attitudes belonging to
this family vary. They can be more or less intensive.50
Hence, someone who rejects autonomy might be legitimately bound to an
autonomy-enhancing body of law insofar as he consents to the law, consent itself
being an expression of belonging and solidarity with the political community.
Placing autonomy at the center of the law, however, is likely to undermine
the sense of belonging that would drive consent to the law’s authority. Consider
the position of member of a conservative religious community that largely
rejects the presuppositions of autonomy theories. Raz argues that in principle
it is permissible to use coercion to break up such communities, but “a test of
viability is the most important consideration in determining policy towards
such groups.”51 In practice, such groups must be tolerated because their
VXSSUHVVLRQZRXOGEHXQUHDVRQDEO\GLI¿FXOWLQDOOEXWWKHPRVWH[WUHPH
cases. This is toleration, but, as Raz notes, “Typically a person is tolerant
if and only if he suppresses a desire to cause another a harm or hurt which
he thinks the other deserves.”52 Such tolerance is a stance that is unlikely to
breed attachment to the community rather than alienation from it. It is not the
mutual toleration of a truly pluralistic regime, but one where the autonomypursuing authorities grant a limited dispensation to communities found to be
ultimately unworthy of respect. Such tolerance sends the message that those
communities are “outsiders, not full members of the political community.”53
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 88-91.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 401-02.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring).
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This doesn’t mean that those who reject autonomy as an ideal should not be
subject to the authority of the political community’s laws. It does suggest it
is unlikely that autonomy will provide a compelling defense of those laws.
B. Defenses of Liberalism without Autonomy
There is another kind of liberalism that does not place personal autonomy
at the center of its political theory. Perhaps the starkest modern statement
of this approach was given by Judith N. Shklar in her famous essay “The
Liberalism of Fear.”54 Shklar’s essay sounds what to some ears must seem a
very pessimistic note. She points out that the liberal ideal has seldom been
achieved in historical practice. However, her pessimism is also theoretical.
She does not ground liberalism in a theory of human freedom and the need for
SHUVRQDODXWRQRP\LQKXPDQÀRXULVKLQJ1RUGRHVVKHLQVLVWWKDWOLEHUDOLVP
VKRXOGEHMXVWL¿HGE\UHIHUHQFHWRDVHWRISUHSROLWLFDOQDWXUDORUXQLYHUVDO
rights, as in the Declaration of Independence. Rather, she sees liberalism as
primarily a response to the misery created by domination and cruelty. Hers is
a political theory largely shorn of normative romance about human freedom.
Rather, it focuses on the fact that “. . . fear and favor that have always inhibited
freedom are overwhelmingly generated by governments, both formal and
informal.”55 She concedes that “while the sources of social oppression are
indeed numerous, none has the deadly effect of those who, as the agents of
the modern state, have unique resources of physical might and persuasion
at their disposal.”56
Shklar goes on to insist that while the liberalism of fear does not offer any
theory about the summum bonum of political life, it does have a theory of the
summum malum. “That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very
fear of fear itself.”57 Lest anyone mistake her meaning, she writes:
:KDWLVPHDQWE\FUXHOW\KHUH",WLVWKHGHOLEHUDWHLQÀLFWLRQRISK\VLFDO
and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group by
stronger ones in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible,
RIWKHODWWHU,WLVQRWVDGLVPWKRXJKVDGLVWLFLQGLYLGXDOVPD\ÀRFN
to occupy positions of power that permit them to indulge their urges.
But public cruelty is not an occasional personal inclination. It is made
possible by differences in public power, and it is almost always built
into the system of coercion upon which all governments have to rely
54
55
56
57

Shklar, supra note 6.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 29.
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WRIXO¿OOWKHLUHVVHQWLDOIXQFWLRQV$PLQLPDOOHYHORIIHDULVLPSOLHGLQ
any system of law, and the liberalism of fear does not dream of an end
of public, coercive government. The fear it does want to prevent is that
which is created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed
acts of force and by habitual and pervasive acts of cruelty and torture
performed by military, paramilitary, and police agents in any regime.58
Her argument suggests that more perfectionist visions of liberalism, which place
individual autonomy at the center of their theories, massively underestimate
the fragility of liberal regimes and the pervasive risk of inhumanity. The focus
of liberal theorizing, she insists, should be less ambitious and more attuned
to the primal risk of cruelty in political life.
There are other versions of a modest liberalism that refuse to give pride
of place to personal autonomy but which present a view of political life
somewhat less dark and fraught than that offered by Shklar. Rather, they
center on the value of peaceful coexistence in the absence of an overriding
commitment to personal autonomy.59 It is possible to defend liberal institutions
and practices without grounding that defense in ideals of self-ownership and
personal autonomy. For example, the John Rawls of Political Liberalism
abandoned his earlier efforts to prove that all reasonable people would prioritize
personal freedom over any particular vision that they might happen to hold
about the shape of the good life.60 Rather, he sought to defend liberalism
by arguing that it could be supported by an “overlapping consensus” of
reasonable comprehensive beliefs.61 Others have gone farther, insisting that
OLEHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHVQHHGQRWHYHQUHÀHFWDOLPLWHGFRQYHUJHQFH
on normative principles as suggested by Rawls. Rather, a regime based on
limited government and a broad sphere for private action can command de
facto legitimacy as a modus vivendi among individuals and groups that may
lack any deeper normative consensus.62 On this view, liberalism is not the end
58 Id. at 29.
59 See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, GRAY’S ANATOMY: SELECTED WRITINGS (2009) (essays
expressing skepticism of ambitious liberal philosophies); MCCABE, supra note 6.
60 Compare JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (arguing that principles of
justice can be generated by a thin, shared public reason), with JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (2005) (arguing that principles of justice result from choice
and agreement in an “original position”).
61 See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765,
765–807 (1997) (defending a limited idea of public reason); John Rawls, The
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233
(1989) (arguing for limited normative convergence in liberal principles of justice).
62 See MCCABE, supra note 6.
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of history nor need we claim that liberal institutions represent a universally
valid commitment to personal autonomy. Instead, liberal institutions and
practices are adaptive responses to the problems created in concrete historical
circumstances, circumstances characterized by deep ethnic, cultural, sexual,
religious, and moral pluralism.
The attraction of rejecting a liberalism grounded in a robust defense of
SHUVRQDODXWRQRP\FDQEHVHHQE\FRQVLGHULQJWKHMXVWL¿FDWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWV
of liberal theory. Liberal theories must be able to justify themselves to those
over whom liberal regimes claim authority. There are two reasons for this: the
¿UVWLVSUDFWLFDO3ROLWLFDOOHJLWLPDF\UHTXLUHVDEURDGEDVHRIPLQLPDOVXSSRUW
A regime that cannot claim the allegiance of broad swaths of its citizenry will
likely either face instability or rely heavily on the coercive capacity of the state
to enforce its will. Both options present problems. Political instability makes
the private choice and planning envisioned by liberal regimes increasingly
GLI¿FXOW2QWKHRWKHUKDQGDKHDY\UHOLDQFHRQWKHFRHUFLYHFDSDFLW\RIWKH
state risks the kind of abuses and domination by the powerful that are generally
regarded as political evils. Hence the need to offer reasons that are likely to
be broadly acceptable to the citizens of liberal polities.
7KHVHFRQGUHDVRQZK\OLEHUDOUHJLPHVPXVWEHMXVWL¿DEOHWRWKHLUFLWL]HQV
is theoretical rather than practical. Broadly speaking, liberalism is tied up
with what we might call the Enlightenment Project. This is the insistence that
political reasons be publically available and not rely on esoteric claims of
authority grounded in tradition or mystery.63 Jeremy Waldron put the point thus:
>7@KHOLEHUDOLQVLVWVWKDWLQWHOOLJLEOHMXVWL¿FDWLRQVLQVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDO
life must be available in principle for everyone, for society is to be
understood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of
the community. Its legitimacy and the basis of social obligation must
be made out to each individual, once the mantle of mystery has been
lifted, everybody is going to want an answer. If there is some individual
WRZKRPDMXVWL¿FDWLRQFDQQRWEHJLYHQDQGVRIDUDVKHLVFRQFHUQHG
the social order had better be replaced by other arrangements, for the
status quo has made out no claim to his allegiance.64
7KLVGRHVQ¶WPHDQRIFRXUVHWKDWOLEHUDOWKHRULHVPXVWEHMXVWL¿HGE\DUJXPHQWV
WKDWHYHU\RQHLQIDFW¿QGVSHUVXDVLYH+RZHYHUWKRVHDUJXPHQWVPXVWUHVWRQ
63 See ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 81-115 (2000)
(setting forth the argument that citizens must make their public arguments in
publically acceptable terms).
64 Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 135
(1987) (emphasis in the original).
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SUHPLVHVWKDWDOOFLWL]HQVVKDUH7RUHVWWKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUVXFKDUHJLPHRQ
premises that many citizens reasonably — even if ultimately mistakenly —
reject requires a retreat to appeals to special authority or the naked coercive
capacity of the state.
7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKLVMXVWL¿FDWRU\UHTXLUHPHQWFDQEHVHHQE\QRWLQJWKH
deeply ambivalent status of personal autonomy in many important systems
of belief. The center of many autonomy theories is a strong assumption of
self-ownership. For this vision, it is self-evident that every individual has the
ultimate moral authority over his or her own decisions and course of life.
For many people in advanced democracies, particularly those socialized into
a largely liberal and cosmopolitan point of view by institutions of higher
education, the assumption of self-ownership seems unquestionable. However,
in all likelihood it represents a minority position not only historically but also
globally and perhaps even within advanced liberal democracies themselves. This
is important because, as noted by Waldron, the legitimacy of liberal institutions
rests on the possibility of justifying those institutions to those over whom
they claim authority.65 The views of citizens that reject the presuppositions of
autonomy theory must count in such arguments. If many of the citizens toward
whom these arguments are addressed reject the foundational assumptions of
DXWRQRP\WKHRULHVWKHQVRPHRWKHUMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUOHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQVPXVW
be found.
Rejection of self-ownership might come from a variety of sources. In
PDQ\FXOWXUHVSHRSOHUHJDUGWKHPVHOYHVDVFODLPHG¿UVWE\WKHLUIDPLOLHV
and communities rather than the self. The starkest challenge to the idea of
self-ownership, however, comes from certain strands of monotheistic religion,
which often conceptualizes human beings not as owners of themselves and
authors of their own lives but rather as creatures of an all-powerful creator. To
be sure, there are monotheistic thinkers who give pride of place to individual
choice. Think of Soren Kierkegaard’s existentialism.66 However, such thinkers
would likely deny that the purpose of religion is to provide another item on
life’s menu of choices. Rather, they would reverse the normative polarity of
autonomy theory, insisting that choice is important because it is necessary to
truly encounter God. More importantly, the negation of self before God is an
important and recurring theme in monotheistic religion. Islam, for example,
65 See MCCABE, supra note 6, at 5 (“The main idea here is that liberal theorists are
committed to an account of political legitimacy which states that the fundamental
principles structuring the politcal realm must be such as can be rationally
vindicated to citizens subject to it.”).
66 See generally SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND SICKNESS UNTO
DEATH (Walter Lowrie trans., 1968) (1843-1849).

2019]

Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear

401

generally does not exalt the self and its capacity to aim and direct itself. Rather,
it takes the idea of submission to the will of God as the primal and proper
moral stance for humanity. Indeed, the very word Islam means submission.67
Likewise, for Christians the New Testament teaches that human beings are
not simply God’s creation but also somehow under further obligation to him
EHFDXVHRIWKHVDFUL¿FHRI-HVXV&KULVW$V3DXOZURWHLQKLV¿UVWHSLVWOHWRWKH
Corinthians, “What? Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy
Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For
ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and in your
spirit, which are God’s.”68 Similarly, the central ambition of some strands of
Judaism is not a wholly self-authored life, but one that is minutely regulated
E\7RUDKDQGWKHLQ¿QLWHO\H[SOLFDWHGUXOHVRIWKH+DODNKD69
The partisans of personal autonomy will hasten to respond at this point
that their vision of liberalism is not necessarily hostile to community, family,
religious belief, or personal devotion. In a properly functioning liberal regime
that respects personal autonomy, they will insist, religious life is to be respected
so long as it results from authentic personal choice. This response, however,
continues to insist on self-ownership and conceptualizes religious piety as a
kind of preference that one might indulge. It makes allegiance to clan, family,
or confession hinge on authenticity conditions that often are not met in the
real faiths, tribes, and kinships around which many people order their lives.
Whatever the merits of a full-throated defense of autonomy, for example, it is
unlikely to command the assent of all pious Muslims or devout Christians who
see the human self and any freedom that it might have as wholly contingent
on God. Furthermore, these are not simply idiosyncratic metaphysical beliefs.
They form the foundation for communities and entire ways of life. John Gray
puts the point thus:
In recent liberal writings, the fact of pluralism refers to diversity of
personal ideals whose place is in the realm of voluntary association. The
67 See Cyril Glasse, Islam, in THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 249, 249-250
(3rd ed. 2008). Islam – submission – is one of the three great pillars of Islamic
religion, the others being iman (faith) and ihsan (virtue). See id. at 243, 238.
68 1 Corinthians 6:19-20 (King James Bible). In Christian theology this idea is
central to soteriology, the theory of salvation. See generally GUSTAF AULEN,
CHRISTUS VICTOR: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE THREE MAIN TYPES OF THE IDEA
OF ATONEMENT (A.G. Hebert trans., 1961).
69 See generally RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN (1984) (setting
forth the spiritual value of a life devoted to Torah); MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH
LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (reprint ed. 2003) (summarizing the history
of Jewish law).

402

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 20.2:381

background idea here is that of the autonomous individual selecting a
particular style of life. This type of diversity resembles the diversity of
ethnic cuisines that can be found in some cities. Like the choice of an
ethnic restaurant, the adoption of a personal ideal occurs in private life.
But the fact of pluralism is not the trivial and banal truth that individuals
hold two different personal ideals. It is the coexistence of different
ways of life. Conventional liberal thought contrives to misunderstand
this fact, because it takes for granted a consensus on liberal values.70
If by liberal values, however, we mean something like the ideal self-ownership
and the primacy of individual autonomy as the foundation for a politically
and morally defensible way of life, no such consensus in fact exists.

III. A MODEST CONTRACT LAW FOR A MODEST LIBERALISM
What are the implications for contract law if we adopt a more modest vision
of liberalism? The key difference between a liberalism based on autonomy
and what we might group together as liberalisms of fear is that for the former
autonomy is a primary normative ideal, one that undergirds the entire apparatus
of liberal institutions. In contrast, for the latter, personal autonomy has merely
instrumental value. Promoting individual autonomy may be a way of fostering
peaceful coexistence among competing and incommensurable ways of life.
Likewise, a healthy regard for individual freedom may discipline the coercive
apparatus of the state and other dominating interests in society, limiting
WKHLUDELOLW\WRLQÀLFWIHDUDQGFUXHOW\RQWKHYXOQHUDEOH+RZHYHUSHUVRQDO
autonomy is no longer taken as a primary political good to be maximized
for its own sake. The implication for contract law lies in this more subdued
stance towards personal autonomy.
For CTC, the state has a positive mandate to increase autonomy by increasing
the range of transactional options available to contracting parties.71 More modest
visions of liberalism, however, offer no reason why the state is obligated to
provide an expanded menu of transactional forms. Rather, contrary to the
position taken in CTC, more modest versions of liberalism would place the
commercial contract at the center of contract law.72 Instead of seeing contract
law as enhancing personal autonomy, a more modest vision of liberalism
70 GRAY, supra note 59, at 32.
71 See CTC, supra note 5, at 68.
72 See generally OMAN, supra note 7 (arguing that markets provide the primary
MXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUFRQWUDFWODZ 1DWKDQ%2PDQMarkets as a Moral Foundation
for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183 (2012) (same).
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would be content for contract law to remain the servant of commerce. Markets
have much with which to recommend themselves to such a modus vivendi
vision of liberalism. Market exchange provides an institutional framework for
cooperation among those with incommensurable worldviews. Indeed, often
it performs this feat better than more overtly political institutions. Thus, the
relative ease and sheer volume of cooperative activity that occurs through
market transactions dwarfs the tortured and frequently unsuccessful process
of public debate, elections, and legislation. 73
Markets also serve to inculcate habits of mutual forbearance that are
particularly useful under conditions where we live in close proximity with those
beyond our social, religious, ethnic, sexual, moral, and political tribes. This
is the so-called doux commerce thesis propounded by Montesquieu and other
18th-century theorists of the market.74 It is possible, of course, to be Panglossian
about doux commerce.75 One cannot plausibly claim that markets will lead
inevitably to widespread mutual tolerance. Indeed, sometimes the opposite is
true.76 Nevertheless, it is true that markets encourage mutual understanding and
73 Jules Coleman makes the point thus:
The conditions under which [citizens] may prefer market to collective or
political decision rules include those cases in which there are fundamental
disagreements about what counts as a good life or makes a life worth living,
where the members of the community are diverse in their backgrounds
and histories and where they are dispersed geographically. In such cases
allocation decision to public debate may create too much strain on the
network of abstract bonds that connect members of the community with
one another. Markets do not pressure those bonds unduly.
JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 69 (2002).
74 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977) (summarizing the arguments
that commerce shackles socially destructive impulses).
75 Indeed, the creator of Pangloss himself might be accused of this sin. Voltaire
presented an incredibly rosy vision of market interaction, writing:
Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than
many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for
WKHEHQH¿WRIPDQNLQG7KHUHWKH-HZWKH0DKRPHWDQDQGWKH&KULVWLDQ
transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give
WKHQDPHRILQ¿GHOWRQRQHEXWEDQNUXSWV7KHUHWKH3UHVE\WHULDQFRQ¿GHV
in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker’s word. At
WKHEUHDNLQJXSRIWKLVSDFL¿FDQGIUHHDVVHPEO\VRPHZLWKGUDZWRWKH
synagogue, and others to take a glass.
VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS 26 (2011).
76 See generally AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2004) (documenting the ways
LQZKLFKOLEHUDOL]LQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOPDUNHWVFDQOHDGWRHWKQLFFRQÀLFW 
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recognition. Successful commerce requires that we understand the goals and
needs of our counterparties. “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”77 This is
a process that requires some mutual understanding. Furthermore, beyond Adam
Smith’s intuitive insight there is modern social science research suggesting
that those who are engaged primarily in commerce for their subsistence are
more prosocial than those who pursue more autarkic economic lives.78
,QVKRUWUDWKHUWKDQGH¿QHFRQWUDFWODZDVDQDXWRQRP\DGYDQFLQJPHQX
of transactional types, contract law has more muted normative ambitions
when grounded in a modest vision of liberalism. It is enough that contract law
supports commerce, with the market being one among several institutional
frameworks that make a modus vivendi between competing and at times
incommensurable ways of life possible. John Gray put the point thus:
The institutions of the market advance human well-being to the extent that
they enable individuals and communities with different or incompatible
goals and interests to trade with one another to mutual advantage.
This classical defense of market institutions can be given another
formulation. Individuals and communities animated by rival and (in
part) incommensurable values can interact in markets without needing to
reconcile these rival conceptions of the good. Market institutions assist
personal autonomy and social pluralism by enabling such communities
WRUHSODFHGHVWUXFWLYHFRQÀLFWE\EHQH¿FLDOFRPSHWLWLRQ79
A necessary condition, however, for any extensive system of healthy markets is
the enforcement of contracts. Furthermore, given the high level of complexity
that we see in modern markets, it is implausible to imagine that legislators
DQGRWKHUODZPDNLQJRI¿FLDOVKDYHWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGH[SHUWLVHWRDXWKRU
the obligations best suited for each kind of commercial transaction.80 CTC
77 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 26–27 (R. H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner
& W.B. Todd eds., 2009) (1776).
78 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 44–47 (summarizing cross-cultural research on the
effects of commerce and cooperative economic activity on trust and pro-social
behavior).
79 GRAY, supra note 59, at 36–37.
80 See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract
and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2016) (arguing that there
are relatively few broadly useful default rules that can be supplied by lawmakers
because of the diversity of transactional situations); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (arguing that centralizing
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suggests that the state can create a large number of transactional structures
with relatively detailed default rules for each structure. However, as Daniel
Markovits and Ala Schwartz persuasively argue, it is unlikely, given the
diversity and complexity of private intentions, that there is much room for
expansion of default terms in the way envisioned by CTC.81 We also have
reasons of political economy grounded in the fear of rent-seeking for favoring
generalized bodies of law.82 Accordingly, we would desire — and in fact
observe — that contract law provides a high level of party autonomy within a
framework of relatively abstract rules that have little if any substantive content.
In this limited sense Williston got it right, and the commercial contract quite
properly is the core case of contract law.
One might object that this less ambitious vision of contract law is both
too pessimistic and too optimistic. It is too pessimistic because it imagines
a deep incommensurability of moral visions, one that cannot be bridged by
a shared vision of the autonomously choosing self. This seems an unduly
dark vision, so goes the argument, of alienated tribes simmering on the edge
of the war of all against all. At the same time, a critic might argue, the doux
commerce vision of the market is impossibly optimistic, a fantasy vision of
contented and peaceful merchants pursuing happiness and prosperity for all.
Ultimately, however, it is the autonomy vision that is both too optimistic
and too pessimistic. For the autonomous chooser to act as the solvent of
moral pluralism, people must be persuaded of the moral sovereignty of the
autonomous chooser and as a theoretical matter such a chooser must be possible.
Both of these are dubious propositions. The moral world is probably not best
thought of as a glorious ethnic food fair with an ever-expanding menu of
exotic options to be tasted and sampled by the moral chooser. This may sound
pessimistic, but it seems nothing more than a realistic acceptance of the deep
moral pluralism that in fact exists in the world, a pluralism that is unlikely to
recede in the face of autonomy theories, no matter how eloquent and elegant
in construction. This doesn’t mean, however, that we are condemned to live
in illiberal societies. A modest liberalism is, seen from another perspective,
quite optimistic. It suggests that despite deep moral pluralism — a pluralism
decision making about economic matters is doomed to failure because of the
GLI¿FXOW\RIDPDVVLQJWKHQHFHVVDU\LQIRUPDWLRQ 
81 See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, Plural Values in Contract Law: Theory
and Implementation, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 571 (2019) (criticizing CTC’s
default rules project as impractical).
82 See generally Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO.
L.J. 77 (2009) (arguing that specialized bodies of contract law create incentives
for rent-seeking behavior).

406

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 20.2:381

that forecloses even agreement on a morally sovereign self that chooses
amongst moral positions — it is nevertheless possible to generate consensus
around liberal practices and institutions. Such agreement does not require a
foundation of autonomously choosing agents. It is enough that one prefers
peace to war with one’s neighbors and recognizes that enemies and heretics
may ascend to the control of powerful institutions in society. Accordingly,
the scope of those institutions’ authority ought to be limited.
7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHMXVWL¿DELOLW\RIOLEHUDOLQVWLWXWLRQVLVKLVWRULFDOO\
contingent. It holds true for the current conditions in pluralistic societies, but
it may be possible to imagine historical conditions in which a modus vivendi
FDVHIRUOLEHUDOLVPPD\EHGLI¿FXOW+RZHYHUIDFHGZLWKWKHFKRLFHEHWZHHQ
a theory that works given current conditions but might fail in imagined
conditions, and a theory that can succeed under imaginary conditions but
is deeply problematic given the world in which we live, prudence seems to
counsel in favor of the former over the latter.
When it comes to the scope of contract law, we can see the difference
between CTC and an approach based on a more modest vision of liberalism by
considering how each theory would approach the issue of same-sex marriage.
Obviously, traditionalists and proponents of same-sex marriage have very
different views regarding the propriety of extending marriage to include gay
and lesbian couples. However, despite these differences, they share a view of
marriage that does not place autonomy at the center of debates about same-sex
marriage. Rather, the question whether the law should provide alternatives
to heterosexual marriage hinged on whether or not same-sex unions could
provide the goods associated with marriage and whether or not there was a
social need for a legal institution of marriage for same-sex couples.83 The
central issues revolved around the nature of sexual identity, the goods of
marriage, and the desire of same-sex couples for social recognition. None of
these concerns were ultimately about extending the autonomy of LGBT or
straight couples by expanding the range of options among which they could
choose. Indeed, the heart of the LGBT critique of the traditionalist position
is that because of immutable sexual orientations heterosexual marriage was
not a viable option for same-sex couples, who nevertheless sought the goods
associated with marriage.
Elizabeth and Robert Scott, although paying lip service to the language
of freedom and autonomy, provide a model of alternative marriage structures
83 Compare RAUCH, supra note 35 (making a “conservative” case for same-sex
marriage); 6+(5,)*,5*,65<$17$1'(5621 52%(573*(25*(, WHAT IS
MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012) (arguing that same-sex unions
don’t advance the goods of marriage).
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that highlights the limited role of autonomy in debates over their legal
recognition.84 They begin with the brute empirical fact that while same-sex
marriage has managed to win widespread legal recognition (they were writing
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell85), other alternative family
structures, such as polygamy and polyamory, have not succeeded in gaining
legal recognition.86 They posit that one of the central roles of marriage in
our society is to handle what they call “dependency needs” and that society
is unwilling to extend legal recognition to alternative family structures until
those structures demonstrate that they are capable of successfully meeting
these “dependency needs.”87 The failure of polygamy and polyamory to gain
OHJDOUHFRJQLWLRQUHVXOWVIURPWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHURUQRW
WKHVHDOWHUQDWLYHVWUXFWXUHVFDQPHHWWKRVHQHHGV7KHGLI¿FXOW\DULVHVERWK
because the participants in such arrangements may be unsure as to their ultimate
success and stability and because society at large lacks good information
about the effectiveness of such arrangements in meeting “dependency needs.”88
The success of the same-sex marriage movement arose out of the fact that
prior to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage there were already many
long-term, monogamous same-sex couples. The experience of these couples
provided evidence both to the couples themselves and to the broader society
that same-sex marriage could effectively meet such “dependency needs.”89
If marriage is primarily a way in which the state recognizes and accommodates
actually existing ways of life, rather than enhancing autonomy by expanding
the range of marital options available to citizens, then the relationship between
marriage and contract law shifts. A more modest vision of liberalism would be
content to conceptualize contract law as primarily a mechanism for enhancing
well-functioning markets. Accordingly, the question whether or not a particular
area of life or area of the law should be contractualized hinges on whether

84 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status:
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 293 (2015) (offering a theory of the success of novel marriage structures).
85 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015).
86 Scott & Scott, supra note 84, at 314 (“In a society in which the public accepts
family diversity and acknowledges the importance of families to individual and
collective welfare, what explains the legal inertia?”).
87 Id. at 316-18 (discussing the problem of relational novelty).
88 Id.DW GLVFXVVLQJWKHGLI¿FXOW\RIREWDLQLQJOHJDOUHFRJQLWLRQIRUSRO\JDPRXV
families).
89 Id. at 344-58 (discussing the success of same-sex marriage proponents and the
sources of that success).
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or not we wish to extend market structures into that area.90 In the context of
marriage, this suggests that the move to contractualize marriage through the
enforcement of such devices as prenuptial agreements is in part a matter of
injecting the process of adversarial bargaining into intimate family relationships.91
Not surprisingly, the law has been suspicious of such efforts.92
The modest vision of liberalism and the associated market-centered vision
of contract law would suggest that the law’s suspicion in this context is well
MXVWL¿HG7KLVLVQRWEHFDXVHDV&7&DUJXHVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRSURYLGHFLWL]HQV
with a range of options from which to choose in forming their families. Rather,
the fear is that by injecting commercial values into areas of life generally not
governed by commercial concerns, the state may be undermining those ways
of life. It is precisely, however, the need to accommodate differing ways of
life within a modus vivendi that counsels against the state intervening in or
undermining a particular way of life unless it has some reason to do so based
on concerns related to cruelty or domination.93
Hence, a market-based theory of contract would have relatively little to
say about same-sex marriage, although it would rest on a vision of liberal
political philosophy that is friendly to the claims of same-sex couples insofar
as those claims represent an actual way of life being pursued by citizens.
However, the market theory would suggest a certain level of suspicion around
the contractualization of marriage, whether of the same-sex or oppositesex variety. Crucially, this approach to contract law does not insist that
every legal obligation triggered by voluntary or intentional action should be
conceptualized as a contract and that the law governing such transactions is
a “law of contracts” that an adequate theory of contract law must address. No
one argues that an adequate theory of contract must account for doctrines such
90 See OMAN, supra note 7, at 173-75 (discussing how extending contract law can
extend a commercial ethos into a non-commercial setting).
91 Id. at 174-79 (discussing the contractualization of marriage).
92 See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §9(a) (1983) (setting forth formation
requirements – such as full disclosure and representation by counsel – not
ordinarily required to form a contract). See generally Brian Bix, Bargaining
in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How
We Think About Marriage, 40 :0 0$5</5(9 145 (1998) (arguing that
the premarital contracting creates unique challenges because of the bargaining
context).
93 See JACOB T. LEVY, RATIONALISM, PLURALISM, AND FREEDOM 283 (2015) (“[A]
liberal understanding of freedom is constitutively torn between a rationalist
distrust of the local, the particular, and power embedded within group life, and
a pluralist emphasis on the freedom found within and protected by group life
against the power of the state.”).
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as waiver, laches, or equitable estoppel, which involve the shifting of legal
rights as a result of voluntary choices, even when such choices are intended
to shift such rights. The same is true of marriage. Marriage law in general
is not a branch of contract law that a theory of contract must explain. It is
HQRXJKWKDWFRQWUDFWODZFDQEHMXVWL¿HGZLWKLQDSROLWLFDOWKHRU\²LQWKLV
case a modest, modus vivendi liberalism — that can also justify and critique
the law of marriage.

CONCLUSION
CTC is an important, elegant, and novel contribution to contract theory. It
represents a step forward over earlier, rights-based theories that have traditionally
formed the heart of liberal theories of contract law. Likewise, CTC is to be
praised for its willingness to take seriously the insights of law and economics
IRUODUJHVZDWKVRIFRQWUDFWGRFWULQHZKLOHLQVLVWLQJWKDWHI¿FLHQF\DQDO\VLV
requires a more sophisticated normative basis than the implicit utilitarianism
on which it is generally rested.
Notwithstanding these virtues, CTC presents a vision of contract law which
LVQRWZLWKRXWGLI¿FXOWLHV,WUHTXLUHVDQDOOHJLDQFHWRDSDUWLFXODUO\JUDQGLRVH
vision of liberalism that places at its center a strong vision of autonomously
FKRRVLQJLQGLYLGXDOVDQGWKHQHFHVVLW\RIDXWRQRP\IRUKXPDQÀRXULVKLQJ
$VDQHPSLULFDOPDWWHULWLVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKLVYLVLRQRIKXPDQÀRXULVKLQJFDQ
command substantial support outside of well-educated circles in advanced
liberal democracies. Many reasonable people are likely to reject the core
assumptions of self-ownership and personal autonomy on which the theory
rests. While these individuals and groups may ultimately be mistaken about
the nature of human beings and the good life, political and legal institutions
QHYHUWKHOHVVPXVWEHMXVWL¿HGE\DQDUJXPHQWWKDWVXFKLQGLYLGXDOVDQGJURXSV
ZRXOG¿QGSODXVLEOH,WLVQRWHQRXJKDVOLEHUDOWKHRULVWVDUHDWWLPHVSURQH
WRGRWRDUWL¿FLDOO\FRQVWULFWWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIDUHDVRQDEOHFLWL]HQVRDVWR
gerrymander philosophical consensus around highly contestable visions of
KXPDQFKRLFHDQGKXPDQÀRXULVKLQJ
Fortunately, maintaining the de facto legitimacy and normative ERQD¿GHV
of liberal institutions and practices does not require widespread acceptance
of a vision of humanity as autonomous choosers of their own, self-authored
visions of the good. Those for whom the vision of self-ownership seems foreign,
or who reject the normative primacy of self-authorship in favor of ways of
life based around communal, familial, or religious piety, can nevertheless
accept and celebrate liberal practices and institutions as a way of peacefully
and productively coexisting in a world with multiple incommensurable ways
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of life. Subscribing to this more modest vision of liberalism, however, has
implications for our theory of contract law. A contract law grounded in such
a theory of liberalism will likewise be more modest. Rather than pursue a
grandiose project of enhancing fundamental human autonomy, it is enough
for contract law to act as a midwife to commerce.

